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Abstract
We estimate the effects of income from various sources on charitable giving using
administrative German income tax data. We demonstrate that charitable con-
tributions are not uniformly affected by different income types. While business
and capital income exhibit a positive effect, the remaining income sources do not
influence charity on statistically significant levels. This exercise is not new and
has been conducted for (at least) three different purposes: 1) Relying on the de-
scribed results, a public finance researcher would state that business and capital
income are more prone to tax evasion than the remaining income sources. 2) An
entrepreneurship researcher would conclude that business owners are more generous
than employees, and 3) a researcher testing the validity of the life cycle theory (or
its behavioral counterpart) would refute the fungibility of income. In contrast, we
argue that none of these approaches can answer the intended question if solicitation
effects of fundraising or measurement error of the income sources are not taken into
account. Applying a fixed effect poisson model, we demonstrate that under certain
assumptions the results can have a meaningful interpretation.
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1 Introduction
Do business owners evade more taxes than employees?
Do self-employed donate more to charity than the general population?
Does the life-cycle consumption hypothesis hold?
At first sight these three question seem to be at most loosely related. Yet, economist answer all
of these questions by running essentially the same regression:
(1) Donations = α+ β1 Income source+ β2X + .
We use German administrative income tax data and also regress charitable donations on
seven different income sources. We find that capital and business income positively influence
charitable giving, whereas there are no statistically significant effects for remaining income
sources such as employee income, income from agriculture or rental and leasing. This exercise
is not new and has been conducted for (at least) three different purposes. Relying on results
originating from the estimation of equation (1), 1) researchers in public finance would state
that business owners and capital income earners evade more taxes than employees (Feldman
and Slemrod 2007). Using the same results, 2) entrepreneurial researchers would conclude
that business owners are more generous than employees (Tietz and Parker 2014), while 3)
researchers testing the validity of the life cycle theory (or its behavioral counterpart) would
refute the fungibility of income (Levin 1998; Steinberg et al. 2010). In contrast, we argue that
none of these approaches can answer the intended question.
The first question is a consumption based approach to investigate tax evasion, as pioneered
by Pissarides and Weber (1989). Instead of food consumption, however, donations are used
as the good of consumption because information on charitable donations is available in admin-
istrative tax data and from many surveys. The approach rests crucially on the assumption
of a comparable charitable inclination between different income sources. If this holds true,
all differences in the effect size of the different income sources on charitable donations can be
traced backed to income under-reporting and can, in case of administrative tax data, be in-
terpreted as tax evasion. The presumption of an invariable charitable inclination is, however,
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a strong requirement given that entrepreneurs and wealthy people are more likely to receive
charitable solicitations. The fundraising literature regularly addresses the topic of prospect
analysis and wealth screening to gain new donors (e.g., Filla and Brown (2013)). Additionally,
many professional donor search agencies advertise these capabilities to non-profit organizations,
and software companies supply nonprofits with the necessary tools to screen systematically for
donors by using publicly available data on real estate wealth, public company insiders and other
professionals such as lawyers and medical doctors.1 Thus, the assumption of a invariable chari-
table inclination also implicitly asserts the ineffectiveness of fundraising. However, being asked
to donate is known to be a powerful predictor of actual donations (Andreoni and Payne 2013).2
Ignoring the different frequencies of charitable solicitations is thus likely to upward bias the
estimates and thus to overstate tax evasion.
The second question focuses on comparisons of generosity between earners of business and
employment income and has gained some attention in entrepreneurial research against the back-
ground on how personality traits of entrepreneurs differ to the ‘normal’ population.3 However,
as for the first question, it is important to keep the solicitation effect in mind. Neglecting this
effect would upward bias the generosity estimates because they could simply reflect a higher
likelihood of being asked and would thus spuriously label entrepreneurs and wealthy people as
intrinsically more generous than the rest of the population. Furthermore, measurement errors
based on income-underreporting may bias the results. This particularly holds true for underre-
porting of business income – both for administrative tax data but also for household surveys.
For instance, Hurst et al. (2014) provide evidence that the self-employed under-report their in-
come in household surveys by approximately 25%. Ignoring this issue translates into an higher
generosity of business owners compared to non-business owners with identical true income and
charitable inclination.
The third question tests the life cycle hypothesis, which implies the fungibility of income. In
case of charitable donations, this means an equal inclination to donate irrespective of the source
1 See, e.g., the information by Blackbaud Inc., which is a software supplier for non-
profit organizations: https://www.blackbaud.com/files/resources/downloads/WhitePaper_
ProspectResearchForTheNonResearcher.pdf.
2 Andreoni and Rao (2011) also stress the ‘power of the ask’ effect suggesting that communication, i.e.,
asking for charitable giving, has an effect on a donors generosity.
3 The general question has been raised, for instance, by Baumol (1990). Concerning selfishness/altruism
see, e.g., Weitzel et al. (2010); for charitable giving Tietz and Parker (2014).
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of income. Neither results an additional euro in current salary in a larger increase in donations
compared to an additional euro in interest income, nor does an additional euro in business
income imply a higher donation compared to an additional euro in income from employment.
If this conjecture does not hold, the assumption of fungible income for charitable giving must
be rejected. However, as for the previous questions, both measurement errors based on income
underreporting and variable charitable inclinations must be taken into account. Otherwise,
differing estimates might not reflect differing marginal propensities to consume, but rather
misreported income or a differing exposition to fundraising activities.
Improving the research on these three questions, however, is of practical importance. Of
course we need to understand the dynamics of tax evasion with respect to different sources of
income. To detect the whole extent of tax evasion additional inference from observational or
administrative data is necessary, as audits are unable to detect all sources of income under-
reporting such as cash transaction (Feldman and Slemrod 2007). Scrutinizing entrepreneurial
generosity is interesting because it reveals the validity of the claim that a society benefits from
its entrepreneurs beyond their influence on economic development. That is, certain personal
traits such as, e.g., philanthropy spill over to a socially beneficial behavior (Acs and Phillips
2002). Finally, knowledge about the connection of income fungibility and charitable donations
is insightful as it can be suggestive of changes in total giving when it comes to short-term or even
structural changes in the composition of income, for example in the context of a crisis. These
insights are not only valuable for nonprofit organizations and fundraisers (which are partially
financed by donations) in order to facilitate their financial planning, but also for governments
whose revenues are affected through the tax deductibility of charitable giving.
We propose a simple solution to control for both, measurement errors in income and the
frequency of charitable solicitations. Under the assumption that both effects are time invariant
– at least for a short period – they can be treated in an econometric investigation as unob-
served heterogeneity and thus do not constitute an omitted variable bias any longer. We admit
that assuming both effects as temporary time invariant is still an assumption, nevertheless, it
improves the current state of research as it discloses the assumption and hence enables a mean-
ingful interpretation for the results of the estimation of equation (1). Additionally, we suggest
directions to further improve research on the topics at hand.
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In order to implement tax unit fixed effects, we estimate a fixed effects poison model (FEPM)
which additionally solves various econometric difficulties inherent in other models so far applied
in this context (for a thorough discussion see Section 3).4
Our paper thus differentiates from the existing literature, which either uses cross-sectional
data (Brooks 2002; Feldman and Slemrod 2007)5 or bases the estimation on random effects
models (Daneshvary and Luksetich 1997; Steinberg et al. 2010; Tietz and Parker 2014).6 Fur-
thermore, none of the studies point to the trade-off in studying tax evasion, entrepreneurial
generosity, or income fungibility.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we describe the data set
and our variables of interest. The estimation strategy and the results are presented in Section
3. Section 4 concludes with a discussion of the results and suggestions for further improvements
of this kind of research.
2 Data
We base our analysis on the 5% sample of the German Taxpayer Panel, which is derived from
the yearly German Income Tax Statistics by the Federal Statistical Office (FSO). We use the
waves from 2001 to 2006, as this period covers several tax reforms (see figure 2) enabling a
separate identification of income and tax price effects (Triest 1998). To construct a panel data
set, the FSO linked up the observations of the single years according to the individual’s tax
identification number or other individual identifiers.7 The persons that could not be linked up
4 To the best of our knowledge, Reinstein (2011) is the only author applying the FEPM in the context
of charitable giving. He does, however, not distinguish between effects from different income sources.
5 Brooks (2002) employs cross-sectional data from the consumer expenditure survey and finds a nega-
tively inelastic reaction of charitable giving to changes in welfare income as opposed to earned income.
Feldman and Slemrod (2007) use 1999 U.S. tax return data from the internal revenue service statistics
to estimate an unweighted non-linear least squares estimation.
6 Daneshvary and Luksetich (1997) rely on U.S. tax return data from the internal revenue service tax
model file and provide results based on standard OLS, OLS random effects, and an OLS fixed effects
estimation for a subsample of high income earners. Steinberg et al. (2010) use a random effects
tobit model and employ panel survey data which contain information on both household income and
wealth from the panel study of income dynamics as well as information on household giving from the
center on philanthropy. Tietz and Parker (2014) employ both random-effects probit and tobit models.
The data are drawn from the panel study of income dynamics, which is a representative sample of
individual Americans and their families.
7 These identifiers include, among others, place of residence, religious affiliation, gender, and realization
of different types of income.
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are typically young professionals or retirees, which implies that the average income of the panel
is higher than that of the cross-sections. The unit of observation is the single tax return and
not the single taxable individual. If married couples choose the option of joint assessment, they
get the identical tax identification number and are therefore considered as one observation, so
in the following the term ‘tax unit’ will be used to identify the unit of observation.
The data set contains very detailed information on numerous income and tax variables which
– beyond a distinction of the different income sources – allow an accurate computation of the
marginal tax rate. From the data we can infer the amount of charitable contributions declared
by a tax unit in the income tax return. Moreover, the Taxpayer Panel provides information on
several socio-demographic characteristics of the tax units like gender, marital status, age, and
the number of children living with the taxpayer. It should be kept in mind, however, that only
those individuals who filed an income tax return consecutively for all six years are included in
this data set.8 For the sake of the analysis we generate the following variables:
Giving. G is the sum of declared charitable donations and membership-fees in the income
tax return.
Income Sources. The German income tax law distinguishes income, I, from seven different
sources summing up to the overall income of a tax unit: income from agriculture and forestry,
income from business enterprise, income from self-employment, income from employment, in-
come from capital assets, income from rental and leasing, and other income.9 In the baseline
specification, we include the natural logarithm of positive income for each income source. As
we apply a FEPM (see section 3), we can therefore interpret the point estimates as elasticities.
According to the German income tax law, however, it is possible to declare negative income.10
This allows for strategic use of different income categories, which may be especially prevalent in
the case of income from rental and leasing due to specific allowance contingencies. This effect,
however, is not taken into account when we use only positive income. We therefore extend our
8 For the analysis, we further adjust the data by excluding tax units with implausible characteristics
(e.g., tax units switching gender or with implausible age), with restricted tax liability (i.e., taxpayers
who earn their income in Germany but live abroad), and taxpayers younger than 15 years.
9 ‘Other income’ mainly comprises pension income, but also salaries for parliament membership and
income from private disposals.
10 A negative income can either be used for a vertical balancing of losses, i.e., offsetting positive incomes
from other sources in the same assessment period, or can be transferred to the following assessment
periods.
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model and also include the logarithms of absolute negative income for each of the seven income
sources (see column (2) in Table A2 in the appendix).
Tax price of giving. P, the tax-determined price of giving is defined as 1-m, with m
being the marginal tax rate. Defined in this way, P measures the taxpayer’s opportunity cost
of giving in terms of foregone personal consumption. If we take into account the progressivity
of the German income tax system, this implies that high income earners face a considerably
lower price of giving than low income earners. As the marginal tax rate is a function of taxable
income which itself depends on the amount of charitable contributions, we ensure the exogeneity
of P by using the ‘first-dollar price of giving’. This means that we define m as the marginal
tax rate relevant if no donations were made, which is a standard procedure in the literature
(Triest 1998; Andreoni 2006). To obtain the marginal tax rate, we apply the tax scales of the
years 2001 to 2006 to taxable income plus deductible donations.11 Furthermore, all tax units
whose donations are below the standard deduction for special expenses, i.e., all non-itemizers,
are assigned a price of giving equal to 1. The so-called borderline itemizers, however, who
exceed the standard deduction only as a result of the amount of donations they declare in the
income tax return, are excluded from the analysis to maintain exogeneity of the price variable
with regard to giving (Clotfelter 1980).
Socio-demographic variables. X summarizes several socio-demographic characteristics
of the tax unit such as the assessment status (dummy variables for joint or single filing) and
the tax unit’s age. The latter is operationalized with age group dummies for age between 15-24,
25-34, 35-44, 45-54 (baseline), 55-64, and more than 65 years.12 Furthermore, we include several
dummy variables indicating the number of children (one child, two children, three children, and
more than three children; tax units without children are the reference category) and information
whether the place of residence is in the Eastern (dummy equal to 1) or Western (dummy equal
to 0) federal states of Germany.
Time fixed effects. T are time dummy variables to account for time specific effects
11 The German income tax law defines categories of income which are tax exempt but effectively raise
average and marginal tax rates. Depending on the relative magnitude of taxable income and tax
exempt income, marginal tax rates equal to or larger than 1 may occur. Tax units facing such
expropriating taxation are excluded from the analysis as are tax units that exhibit a combination of
extra-ordinary income and tax exempt income, which does not permit an unambiguous calculation
of marginal tax rates.
12 In case of joint assessment, age refers to the ‘principal’ income earner.
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that influence the donation decisions of all tax units equally. During our observation period
this covers for instance several natural disasters (especially floodings in 2002 and 2006) or
macroeconomic effects such as the currency changeover from the Deutsche Mark to the Euro in
2002.
All monetary values are converted into constant 2006 Euro values using the consumer price
index by the German Federal Statistical Office. Descriptive statistics of the control variables
are given in the appendix (Table A1).
Figure 1: Share of tax units with income from different sources
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By using aggregate data from the German income tax statistics we can take a look at
how the income composition has changed in the period 2001-2006. From Figure 1 it becomes
clear that the share of tax units declaring income from employment has continuously decreased
from 87.1% in 2001 to 82.6% in 2006 (figures for income from employment refer to the axis on
the right). Moreover, we observe considerable fluctuations in the share of tax units declaring
income from capital assets (figures for remaining income sources refer to the axis on the left).
The proportion decreased from 17.3% in 2001 to 9.7% in 2003 and went up again to 12.1% in
2006. In the same period, the share of tax units reporting income from business enterprise and
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income from other sources increased considerably whereas the respective growth in the shares
for income from self-employment and income from rental and leasing was more modest.
3 Estimation and results
As mentioned above, depending on the research question, we aim to treat solicitations for
charitable giving and measurement errors of (business) income due to tax evasion as unobserved
heterogeneity. Thus, for both effects we assume an underlying stable pattern, which at least
retains for the observational period.
Assumption 1 is that solicitations for charitable donations are constant within a tax unit
and differ only between the tax units. Concretely, this assumption allows higher solicitations,
e.g., for entrepreneurs or wealthy individuals, which, however, do not vary over time. Thus, the
assumption also entails that fundraisers do not react on every change of income or wealth of a
tax unit, but rather assess income and wealth in certain intervals and keep their solicitations
constant between assessment points.
Assumption 2 is that measurement error of (business) income due to tax evasion is constant
within a tax unit and differs only between tax units. In essence, this means that while we control
for a higher level of tax evasion by self-employed or business owners, we assume that the evasion
pattern is stable over the observational period.
In case of estimating tax evasion, the proposed approach will deliver consistent estimates if
assumption 1 holds. Concerning the estimation of entrepreneurial generosity as well as testing
the life cycle hypothesis, both assumptions have to be valid to deliver consistent estimates.
When estimating the relationship between different income sources and donations, we face
the problem that many tax units report zero donations. This high amount of zeros often
motivates the use of Tobit models. However, a consistent Tobit estimation relies on strong
assumptions, which are mostly not fulfilled. First, the error term is not normally distributed
and homoskedastic. Second, it is questionable whether the explanatory variables affect the
donation decision equally along the extensive and the intensive margin. Third, due to the
incidental parameters problem, a fixed effects estimation of the Tobit model is not feasible.
Given these problems, researchers often estimate log-linearized OLS models, which allow for
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fixed effects and are generally more robust to violations of model assumptions. However, this
model also requires an arbitrary adjustment of the dependent variable. Furthermore, in the
presence of heteroskedasticity, the interpretation of log-linearized OLS models can be highly
misleading, even when robust standard errors are applied (Silva and Tenreyro 2006). A further
alternative, at least for cross sectional data, is an estimation with (unweighted) nonlinear least
squares (NLS) as in Feldman and Slemrod (2007). However, from a practical point of view, it
is far from trivial to implement fixed effects in a NLS regression with panel data. Moreover,
multiplicative NLS models give a higher weight to noisier observations, implying that this
estimator may be inefficient and depends heavily on a small number of observations (Silva and
Tenreyro 2006).
Given all these econometric difficulties it is astonishing that many researchers investigating
charitable donations either stick to the Tobit or the OLS log-linearized model. This is even
more so as the fixed effect poisson models (FEPM) offers solutions to the indicated problems.
For instance, the FEPM takes the non-linearity of donations data into account and controls for
unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, the FEPM has desirable robustness properties for esti-
mating the parameters in the conditional mean making this model also advantageous compared
to simple OLS models. In our case, except for the conditional mean, the distribution of G given
the control variables and the fixed effects is completely unrestricted and neither overdispersion
nor underdispersion pose a problem for the estimation. Moreover, the model does not require a
Poisson distribution and the FEPM also performs well if the proportion of zeros is large (Silva
and Tenreyro 2006; Silva and Tenreyro 2011). Finally, the parameter estimates can be directly
interpreted as elasticities without the need for arbitrary adjustments to zero donations.
Due to these desirable properties the FEPM has been widely used by researchers in the
field of international trade, who are faced with similar data structures of (excess) zeros in the
dependent variable and the presence of heteroskedasticity in constant elasticity models (Silva
and Tenreyro 2006). However, despite similarities in the data structure and thus common
difficulties in econometric analyses, the charity literature to a large extent still focuses to the
Tobit model or simple OLS estimation (for an exception using a FEPM with donation data see
Reinstein (2011)).
Hence, we estimate the mean of Git conditional on all covariates Zit and the fixed effect νi
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using the FEPM:
(2) E(Git|Zit, νi) = exp(β0 + β1Iit + β2Yit + β3Pit + β4Xit + Tt + νi)
To solve the identification problem originating from the fact that the marginal tax rate is
a function of taxable income, we follow Triest (1998) and use an observation period covering
several changes in the tax code to obtain exogenous variation in the tax rates. Figure 2 depicts
that this is indeed the case for the period from 2001 to 2006.
Figure 2: Variation in marginal tax rates, 2001-2006
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We present the estimation results for the various income sources and the tax price of giving
in equation (3).13 The full results including control variables are shown in Table A2 in the
appendix.
13 The number of observations is 1,597,569; log pseudolikelihood: -4.187e+08. Standard errors are
shown in paranthesis; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Gˆ = 0.062
(0.047)
Agriculture+ 0.076
(0.018)
∗∗∗Business+ 0.038
(0.023)
Self-employment
+ 0.004
(0.009)
Employment+ 0.040
(0.007)
∗∗∗Capital + 0.024
(0.013)
Rent&Lease
− 0.005
(0.012)
Other − 1.211
(0.210)
∗∗∗Tax Price + Control Variables.
(3)
The readiness to make charitable contributions differs between the different income sources,
even if we control for fixed evasion patterns and solicitations effects of fundraising. In particular
business and capital income exhibit a highly significant and positive effect on charitable giving.
As the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities, we estimate that a ten percent increase
in business income leads to an increase in charitable donations by approximately 0.8%. A ten
percent increase in capital income raises charitable donations by 0.4%. The remaining income
sources are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Concerning the economic signif-
icance, entrepreneurial income sources such as income from agriculture and self-employment
(and also income from rental and leasing) tend to have a positive effect on charitable giving. In
contrast, income from employment and income from ‘other’ sources turn out to be both eco-
nomically and statistically insignificant. Furthermore, we find a statistically significant elastic
effect for the tax price of giving. A ten percent increase in the tax price reduces charitable
giving by 12.1%.
In Table A2 in the appendix, we further present results for different effects of positive
and absolute negative income. The main results remain, i.e., we find a strong economically
and statistically significant effect of income from business and capital on charitable giving.
Furthermore, for both income sources, the results reverse for absolute negative income, i.e., if
an income loss increases by ten percent, the inclinations to donate decrease by approximately
0.6% (business income) and approximately 1% (capital income). We also find such a strong
negative effect for absolute negative income from agriculture.
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4 Discussion and conclusion
Beyond the pure result that business and capital income are positive and statistically significant
determinants of charitable giving, we can now interpret the results in three different ways: First,
relying on assumption 1 that the tax unit fixed effects pick up (constant) donation solicitations,
we can interpret both coefficients as evasion parameters implying that a 10% increase in business
or capital income increases tax evasion by 0.76% and 0.4%, respectively. Second, additionally
accepting assumption 2 that the fixed effects also cover (time invariant) evasion patterns, the
results can be alternatively interpreted that, e.g., a 10% increase in business income rises do-
nations by 0.76%. Third, we can alternatively reject the fungibility of income with respect to
charitable giving as the point estimates differ between income sources. Clearly, this situation is
somewhat awkward as generosity and evasion are proportional.
Pertaining to the validity of the assumptions, it seems easier to infer tax evasion from
observational or administrative data as only the assumption on fixed solicitation levels has to
be fulfilled. Nevertheless, this assumption might still be too strong and, thus, prevents unbiased
coefficients. An alternative strategy to the consumption based approach for a detection of tax
evasion lies in the identification of a consumption good without solicitation effects, that better
reflects the food characteristics of the original Pissarides and Weber (1989) approach than
charitable donations. In administrative tax data, for instance, education expenses might be
an example as it is hard to argue that beyond an income effect employees or entrepreneurs
care differently about the education of their children. Moreover, advertising for education is
certainly lower than fundraising for charitable giving and it seems unlikely that the promotion
of different educational possibilities is as strategic as professional fundraising.
Concerning the inference of entrepreneurial generosity and the fungibility of income from
observational (or administrative) data, the situation is more involved as both assumptions have
to be fulfilled. Charitable solicitations are hardly entailed in observational data and certainly
not in administrative data, making a direct control difficult. Moreover, as mentioned in the
introduction, understated income by entrepreneurs seems to be pervasive. In comparison to the
solicitation assumptions it is also more unlikely that fixed effects cover tax evasion, as this would
for example rule out that individuals use nonrecurring chances to evade. Therefore, laboratory
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experiments such as Weitzel et al. (2010) or Urbig et al. (2012) seem to be better suited to
investigate entrepreneurial generosity or selfishness, as they allow for a better control of the
circumstances influencing generosity or selfishness.
For an empirical examination of the life-cycle hypothesis two items have to be considered. As
with tax evasion, goods not prone to differing solicitation or advertising effects are more suited
to study this question. Moreover, to avoid measurement error of the different income sources,
a first step could be to exclude entrepreneurs from the analysis or to explicitly instrument for
measurement errors in income sources prone to evasion and under-reporting.
13
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A Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Giving 992.7 47498.1
Log positive income from
Agriculture 0.242 1.480
Business 2.464 4.504
Self-employment 1.892 4.083
Employment 8.990 4.135
Capital 3.592 4.244
Rental and leasing 2.529 4.102
Other sources 1.461 3.412
Log tax price of giving -0.427 0.237
Dummy age 15–24 0.013 0.112
Dummy age 25–34 0.095 0.293
Dummy age 35–44 0.292 0.455
Dummy age 45–54 0.299 0.458
Dummy age 55–64 0.188 0.391
Dummy age 65 and above 0.114 0.318
Dummy single female 0.110 0.312
Dummy single male 0.144 0.351
Dummy married, couple 0.733 0.442
Dummy eastern federal state 0.140 0.347
Dummy catholic 0.412 0.492
Dummy protestant 0.304 0.460
Dummy other confession 0.001 0.024
Dummy no confession 0.284 0.451
Dummy no children 0.465 0.499
Dummy one child 0.199 0.400
Dummy two children 0.245 0.430
Dummy three children 0.072 0.259
Dummy more than three children 0.019 0.135
Dummy year 2001 0.166 0.372
Dummy year 2002 0.166 0.372
Dummy year 2003 0.169 0.375
Dummy year 2004 0.170 0.375
Dummy year 2005 0.171 0.376
Dummy year 2006 0.159 0.365
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical
Office and the statistical offices of the Lnder. Taxpayer
Panel 2001–2006, own calculations. All monetary values
have been converted into constant 2006 Euro values. The
number of observations for each variable is 1,597,569.
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Table A2: Effect of income from different sources on charitable giving
(1) (2)
Log income from agriculture
Positive income 0.062 0.018
(-1.311) (-0.884)
Absolute negative income -0.063∗∗
(-2.692)
Log income from business
Positive income 0.076∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(-4.16) (-5.591)
Absolute negative income -0.061∗∗∗
(-5.478)
Log income from self-employment
Positive income 0.038 0.013
(-1.626) (-1.484)
Absolute negative income -0.025∗
(-2.037)
Log income from employment
Positive income 0.004 -0.012
(-0.518) (-0.944)
Absolute negative income 0.015
(-1.241)
Log income from capital
Positive income 0.040∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(-5.963) (-5.752)
Absolute negative income -0.097∗∗∗
(-4.324)
Log income from rental and leasing
Positive income 0.024 0.007
(-1.837) (-0.573)
Absolute negative income -0.002
(-0.201)
Log income from other sources
Positive income -0.005 -0.027
(-0.443) (-1.420)
Absolute negative income 0.026
(-1.406)
Continued on next page.
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Table A2 (continued)
(1) (2)
Log tax price of giving -1.211∗∗∗ -0.915∗∗∗
(-5.777) (-3.670)
Dummy single female -0.502∗∗∗ -0.535∗∗∗
(-3.478) (-4.226)
Dummy single male -0.027 -0.092
(-0.212) (-1.439)
Dummy married, separate assessed -0.286∗ -0.187
(-2.104) (-1.800)
Dummy age 15–24 0.535∗∗ 0.531∗∗
(-2.672) (-2.962)
Dummy age 25–34 -0.198 -0.029
(-1.534) (-0.269)
Dummy age 35-44 -0.041 -0.012
(-0.487) (-0.238)
Dummy age 55-64 -0.098 0.022
(-0.871) -0.225
Dummy age 65 and above 0.400∗ 0.304∗
(-2.356) (-2.07)
Dummy eastern federal state -0.063 -0.238∗
(-0.764) (-2.091)
Dummy catholic -0.079 -0.187∗
(-0.889) (-2.364)
Dummy protestant -0.105 -0.05
(-0.866) (-0.565)
Dummy one child 0.138∗∗ -0.005
(-2.805) (-0.103)
Dummy two children 0.238∗∗∗ 0.150∗
(-3.951) (-1.974)
Dummy three children 0.199∗ -0.147
(-2.534) (-0.832)
Dummy more than three children 0.417∗∗ -0.139
(-3.164) (-0.613)
Dummy year 2002 0.141 0.125∗
(-1.739) (-2.185)
Continued on next page.
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Table A2 (continued)
(1) (2)
Dummy year 2003 0.047 0.073
(-0.61) (-1.234)
Dummy year 2004 0.111 0.171∗∗
(-1.625) (-2.68)
Dummy year 2005 0.344∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗
(-4.717) (-5.641)
Dummy year 2006 0.340∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(-3.709) (-6.741)
Observations 1,597,569 2,700,659
Log pseudolikelihood -4.187e+08 -1.120e+09
t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Absolute negative values are used in case of negative income.
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